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The 10th National People’s Congress
and After
Moving Towards a New Authoritarianism – Both Elitist and Consultative?
Jean-Pierre Cabestan
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Philip Liddell
1 The meeting in March this year of the 10th National People’s Congress (NPC) confirmed
the  decisions  and  leadership  changes  approved  last  November  by  the  16th Party
Congress. Four months after the delegates at the Party Congress had confirmed the
smooth  handover  of  power  from  the  “third  to  the  fourth  generation”  of  Chinese
leaders, the Party leadership promoted to the head of its “state façade” a new group of
leaders. As expected, Hu Jintao replaced Jiang Zemin as President of the republic, Wen
Jiabao succeeded Zhu Rongji as Prime Minister and Jiang stayed on as president of the
powerful Central Military Commission of the state (and the Party). At the same time,
the political and economic objectives approved at the Party Congress were translated
into government decisions. Here again, the continuity of direction is more important
than the changes,  despite  perceptible  adjustments  since last  summer aimed,  in  the
main, at preventing social unrest and thus at stabilising both society and the political
regime. No real political reform was announced, while the attention of the new leaders
remained  focused  upon  economic  restructuring.  In  particular,  loss-making  state
enterprises  were  progressively  to  be  dismantled;  the  Chinese  economy  was  to  be
adapted  to  the  international  environment  within  which  it  is  gradually  becoming
integrated; social inequalities were to be managed and, if possible, reduced; and the
legal  and  institutional  frameworks  in  which  the  country  is  developing  were  to  be
modernised.
2 This NPC meeting and more generally the aftermath of the 16th Party Congress were
marked in particular by the Iraq War, the spreading epidemic of “atypical pneumonia”,
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or SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), in China, and the North Korean crisis.
For all that, did they achieve anything new? Did they not help to reinforce institutional
and political  trends that have been developing for one,  or even two,  decades? This
change of generation, and the early challenges that the new team has had to confront,
might they not favour a gradual relaxation of China’s authoritarian system? Might they
allow, if not the democratisation of the regime, at least the establishment of a more
open form of authoritarianism? Could this not be characterised both by a profound
elitism and also by consultative mechanisms that no regime of the Soviet type ever
managed to put in place? In short, can authoritarianism be institutionalised?
3 These questions are far-reaching and, clearly, go beyond the scope of this article. Yet,
we may be helped in measuring some of these developments by examining the course
of the recent plenary session of the NPC (March 5th to 18 th 2003) and of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC, March 3rd to 14th 2003) as well as the
new distribution of responsibilities among the country’s top leaders. This study may
also enable us to understand the rivalries and divisions among Party leaders and within
the Chinese state. Thereby, we may attempt to foresee the political changes that may
lie ahead over the coming years.
The meetings of the NPC and the CPPCC
4 In many respects, the first plenary session of the 10th NPC unfolded as have previous
such sessions. This year again, the NPC was composed of central and local delegates
chosen by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); for two weeks it served as a sounding
board for the various economic and social problems that the country is experiencing.
And, as a new legislature was taking over,  this session of the NPC concentrated on
electing the state’s new leaders, lending a less attentive ear to the various work reports
presented to them (on the government, the NPC, the Supreme People’s Court and the
Supreme People’s Procuratorate). 
5 And,  following  institutional  practice  at  the  start  of  each  new  legislature,  the  first
plenary session of the 10th NPC was preceded in February by a plenary meeting of the
Central  Committee  of  the  CCP  appointed  during  the  recent  Party  Congress.  This
meeting  formally  approved  the  “candidates”  for  the  various  available  government
posts “recommended” (tuijian) by the Party, together with the agenda for this session.
6 Similarly, the 2,985 new delegates’ qualifications are hardly any different from those of
their  predecessors:  the  relative  proportions  of  the  various  “socio-political”  groups
represented remain  virtually  unchanged (see  Table  1).  The  largest  grouping  is  still
made up of cadres (32%), that is to say, the Party and state leaders at provincial and
infra-provincial levels; “intellectuals” make up the next biggest grouping (21%) while
“workers and peasants” (18%), delegated in the main by state enterprises and village
committees, are still significantly under-represented. It is the same for women, who
lose 44 deputies and whose place within the leading circles of the Party, as the 16th
Congress has shown, is at best modest (the only woman sitting in the Politburo is Wu
Yi, of whom more anon). By contrast, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), estimated to
number  2.3  million  people,  is  still  generously  over-represented:  it  provides  268
delegates, a number amounting to one deputy for every 8,582 soldiers, as against an
average of one deputy for every 435,511 citizens and one deputy for every 1.08 million
women! Reflecting Hu Jintao’s declared wish for openness towards non-communists,
the only noteworthy development is the rather modest increase (480 as against 460) in
the number of delegates from “democratic parties”, groupings distinct from but closely
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affiliated to the CCP, and from no party (wudangpai), those people formerly known as
“fellow-travellers” of the Communist Party1.  Yet, this new tendency harks back only
timidly to a policy abandoned in 1998: in fact, this group made up 19.2% of the deputies
in 1993 (572). Moreover, most of the remaining deputies belong to the CCP, although
the exact proportion of communists has not been published since the Ninth NPC (in
1993, at the time of the Eighth NPC, 68.4% of deputies were Party members)2.
 
Table 1: The Membership of the 9th and the 10th NPCs (19982003)
NB: in 1998, the total number of delegates was 2,979. The twelve Macau representatives were not
included in this number since Macau was still under Portuguese administration. However, ﬁve of them
were then Guangdong delegates. Between 2000 and 2003, the total number of delegates has been
2,986.
Source: Wenhuibao, March 3rd 2003, p.A6.
7 On the face of it, then, this first meeting of the 10th NPC is no different from the Ninth
(1998) or the Eighth (1993). 
8 Nevertheless,  some  developments  may  be  noted  reflecting  a  greater  acceptance  of
deputies’  independence  and  bringing  to  light  the  rivalries  that  divide  the  Chinese
leadership. First of all, we may wonder whether the system for selecting deputies has
not  gradually  opened up and whether,  because  of  this,  rather  than offering  better
representation to Chinese society, the NPC has not in reality become more elitist. We
may  wonder  too  whether  the  greater—and  still  quite  modest—autonomy  that  the
People’s Congresses enjoy, far from having lessened that tendency, has on the contrary
accentuated it.
9 It is clear that, though formally elected by People’s Congresses at the provincial level,
the members of the NPC are still chosen by the Central Department of the Organisation
of the Communist Party,  with the help of the authorities of  the province that they
represent (or of the PLA). Thus, because they had to belong to the NPC in order to be
elected  state  leaders,  Jiang  Zemin,  Hu  Jintao  and  Zeng  Qinghong  had  themselves
elected, each in one of the 31 provincial level constituencies of their choice (Shanghai,
Tibet and Jiangxi, respectively). Similarly, those representing these constituencies in
the NPC are mostly provincial leaders of the CCP, of the government and of the local
people’s congress. At the local level also (counties, villages), numerous examples show
that  these  elections  are  often  no  more  open  than  formerly  to  citizens  lacking
connections in the system but wishing to take up the openings offered to them by the
law—according to which anyone supported by ten electors may stand as a candidate3.
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The  greater  say  that  congresses  have  in  government  has  generally  resulted  in
strengthening  the  CCP’s  grip  over  the  congresses.  Thus,  23  of  the  31  provincial
congresses are headed by the secretaries of the Party’s provincial committees. Only the
most developed cities and regions (Peking, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangdong, Hubei and
Heilongjiang) and certain non-Chinese minority areas (Xinjiang, Tibet),  for different
reasons, have not experienced this pattern4.
10 Yet,  while  the  NPC delegates  are  selected for  their  loyalty  to  the  regime,  they are
chosen also on the basis of their high education level (in 1998, more than 80% of them
were  university  graduates,  as  against  69%  in  1993;  in  2003  no  statistical  data  was
published), of their professional skills or of the recognition that the regime, following
Jiang Zemin’s  theory of  the  “three  representations”,  seeks  to  give  to  certain social
groups. It  is no surprise that a greater number of private entrepreneurs or,  rather,
“people  involved in the non-public  economy” (feigongyouzhi  jingji  renshi)  are  now
members of the NPC (133 as against 48 in 1998)5. What is more, in a growing number of
regions,  because of  the greater share that the local  people’s  congresses take in the
affairs of government, being elected to these authorities has become a real political
lever  both  for  the  regime’s  “traditional  elites”  (Party  and  state  officials,  heads  of
enterprises and public establishments) and for members of the “new elites”, who are
sometimes willing to spend substantial sums of money to ensure victory at the polls6.
Although the CCP continues to screen the election (or promotion) of these deputies to
congresses at higher levels, it is also more and more sensitive to deputies’ economic
muscle and thus to the contribution, particularly financial, that they may bring to the
collectivity.
11 The consequence of these developments is the increasingly urban and elitist character
of the NPC. According to Hu Angang, city-dwellers are four times better represented
than people living in the countryside (one delegate for every 960,000 country people as
against  one  for  every  260,000  city-dwellers).  And  the  proportion  of  workers  and
peasants has dropped from 54% during the 1950s to 19%7. As formerly, delegates to the
NPC embody an idealised form of political society, one designed more on the model of
priorities set by the communist leadership of the moment than on that of China’s social
realities.  And the changing criteria  for  selection have not  reduced the NPC’s  elitist
character. On the contrary, we may be tempted to advance the hypothesis—one that
only an in-depth sociological study of the deputies, still a difficult task to carry out,
could  confirm—that  the  evolution  of  deputies’  selection  criteria  and  the  NPC’s
relatively growing power have helped to make it more elitist than at the start of the
Deng Xiaoping era, when its deputies were less educated, more rural, often survivors of
the Cultural Revolution and, above all, less well off economically.
12 Even so, these elites do not form, politically or socially, a consistent group. While the
majority of deputies still belong to the regime’s “traditional elites” (Party officials, PLA
officers, workers and model peasants), a probably growing minority represents what
one would be tempted to call the “new elites”8. And this hybrid mixture masks other
divisions, ones that are more political or based on conflicts of economic interests that
have to a certain extent manifested themselves during the leadership elections and
that tend to put into perspective the stability of the socio-political groups represented
in the NPC.
Election surprises
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13 In mid-March, seven state institutions saw their new leaders confirmed in power: the
NPC,  the presidency of  the People’s  Republic,  the Central  Military Commission,  the
Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the State Council and
the CPPCC. The first six sets of appointments were ratified on the basis of a vote by all
of the NPC deputies. The election procedure remained unaltered: a single candidate,
the one proposed by the Party, was put forward for election. So the question was not
whether a leader would be elected or not, but whether he would be more or less well
elected. The only exception, as has been usual since 1988, was again the NPC’s Standing
Committee, an authority for which the number of candidates was slightly above the
number of available posts (167 candidates competing for 159 posts). Nevertheless, this
“unequal  number  election”  (cha’e  xuanju),  as  before,  did  not  include  the  NPC’s
president, its 15 vice-presidents and its Secretary General, who also sit on the Standing
Committee (whose total number went up to 175 members as against 155 in 19989.
14 These decision-making mechanisms, finely controlled as they were, came up with some
surprises. Firstly, it is interesting to note a development for which there is no known
precedent: the election procedure itself was rejected by 34 deputies while 64 others
abstained (2,795 delegates approved it)10. Further, for the first time, during the vote,
deputies were authorised to write an additional name on their ballot papers, an
opportunity that a handful of them actually did grasp11.
15 And, most importantly, the overall message of the delegates was clear: the candidates
close to Jiang Zemin were badly elected whereas Hu Jintao’s supporters were, on the
whole, elected with overwhelming majorities. This reflected the wish of most of China’s
“official elites” to see the torch passed more quickly to the “fourth generation” and in
particular the powers of the “Shanghai group” (Shanghaibang) and the “Jiang Zemin
faction” (Jiangjiaban) curtailed. Will their wishes be granted?
Changing the leadership of the NPC
16 Few  were  surprised  at  the  choice  of  Li  Peng’s  successor  as  NPC  Chairman:  as  has
become usual since 1993, this function is exercised by the number two leader of the
CCP. So it was Wu Bangguo, a former Shanghai boss (1991-1995) then deputy prime
minister and associate of Jiang, who was promoted, rather than Li Ruihuan, chairman
of the CPPCC and favoured candidate up until last October, when he was forced into
premature retirement because of his open opposition to Jiang (see below). However,
despite  Wu’s  political  leanings,  the  deputies  gave  him  massive  support,  no  doubt
because  of  the  regime’s  real  popularity  among  the  official  elites  and  also  in
consideration of the powers, after all quite limited, that the NPC president can wield12.
Even  so,  two  deputies  preferred  Zhu  Rongji  and  one  other  voted  for  Li  Peng13.  By
contrast, Li Tieying, too closely associated with the now past era of Deng Xiaoping and
criticised for his very conservative management of the Academy of Social Sciences, was
almost as badly elected (93.21%) as Ding Shisun, president of the Democratic League,
whose advanced age, 76, probably explains his low score (92.26%). Lu Yongxiang, on the
other  hand,  President  of  the  Academy  of  Sciences,  recorded  a  wholly  honourable
98.71%.  We  should  note  too  that  the  NPC’s  new  number  two,  Wang  Zhaoguo—an
associate  of  Hu  Yaobang  and  then  of  Zhao  Ziyang  during  the  1980s  and  later
responsible for the CCP United Front Department (relations with non-communists) and
for relations with Taiwan—won the almost unanimous support of the deputies (99.18%);
but that the choice of the Congress’s new Secretary General,  Sheng Huaren, former
minister of the economy and trade, seems to have been more controversial (95.86%),
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probably because it is a key position (see Table 2). Among the eight candidates who
failed to win election to the Standing Committee, we should mention Chen Guangyi,
former civil  aviation chief,  Liu  Jiyuan,  the  head of  China’s  Space  Society  and Ruan
Chongwu,  former  Party  secretary  in  Hainan and once  an  associate  of  Hu Yaobang.
While the air disasters that occurred in 2002 may explain Chen’s defeat, the rejection of
the other two men probably has more to do with the deputies’ wish to bring into the
Standing Committee—a more influential authority that meets every two months—more
new blood and in particular the twenty or so “young professional technocrats” whom
the Party leadership added to the list of candidates14.
Table 2: The leadership of the 10th NPC
incumbent Vice-Chairmen٭
NB: The 10th NPC’s Standing Committee and Chairmanship were elected on March 15th 2003. The
Chairmanship includes the Chairman, 15 Vice-Chairmen and the Secretary General, who now is also
Vice-Chairman. The numberof ballots was 2,951. The number of valid ballots was 2,950 for the
Chairman’s election and 2,944 for the Vice-Chairmen’s election. Percentages were calculated by the
Chinese authorities on the basis of the number of valid ballots.
Source: Wenhuibao, March 16th 2003, pA1.
The Presidency of the Republic
17 But it was the election for President and Vice-President of the People’s Republic that
provided one of the biggest surprises. In accordance with the state constitution, Jiang
had to stand down, having served two terms in office. And following a practice laid
down in 1993 by Jiang himself, only the CCP’s new Secretary General, Hu, could claim
the supreme post15. The name of the candidate for the vice-presidency, Zeng Qinghong,
63, remained unknown for a long time despite predictions—accurate, as it turned out—
made as early as spring 2002 in certain press publications16. The post of vice-president
had been largely honorary before 1998: it was occupied between 1993 and 1998 by the
“red capitalist” Rong Yiren. This time, in a show of openness towards society it might
have gone once again to a non-communist. Yet, from the outcome of the 16th Party
Congress, it seemed clear that, if the CCP adhered to the “institutional tradition” laid
down by Hu in 1998, the job must go to the man holding the number five place in the
Standing Committee of the Politburo, namely, to Zeng Qinghong. Indeed, at the time
that Hu was elected vice-president in 1998, he occupied the same official rank, behind
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Jiang,  Li  Peng,  the  prime  minister  Zhu  Rongji  and  the  president  of  the  CPPCC,  Li
Ruihuan.  Does  that  mean  that  the  Vice-President  of  the  republic  is  henceforward,
unfailingly, the presumed successor to the head of state and of the Party? Although one
might think that behind this choice might be glimpsed Jiang’s secret hope of seeing
Zeng one day in the seat of power, the matter is far from decided; and the voting results
this March must have troubled old Jiang’s dreams just a little, if not dampened Zeng’s
ardent ambitions. 
18 For while  Hu was elected by an overwhelming majority  of  deputies  (two,  however,
voted for Jiang!), Zeng scored the worst result of any of the CCP leaders publicly elected
this year to state posts: nearly four hundred voters withheld their support, which gave
him an approval rating of 87.54%! This poor showing is on a par with that of Li Peng in
March 1993 when he was re-elected prime minister: 2,537 votes in favour (88.6%), 210
votes against and 120 abstentions. It should be noted also that this percentage is even
lower than that obtained by the conservative general, the late Wang Zhen, when he was
elected  Vice-President  of  the  republic  in  1988  (90% in  favour)17.  Moreover,  a  small
number  of  ballots  (27)  were  marked  in  support  for  other  leaders,  among  them  Li
Changchun,  the former secretary of  Guangdong province (6),  Zhu Rongji  (3)  and Li
Ruihuan (1). The announcement of these unusual results was greeted with widespread
laughter among the delegates, their hilarity probably not shared by the man elected—
and  not  by  Jiang  either18.  Indeed,  while  these  percentages  may  seem  high  in  a
democratic context, in the Chinese political system they reflect a genuine revolt, and
are perceived in this way both by those elected and by the electors and the general
public,  although the latter  was largely  kept  in  the dark since only Hong Kong and
foreign media reported the percentages that we are discussing (see Table 3).
19 This result has without doubt had some consequences that are not yet fully apparent.
For instance, we may wonder if the considerable time that Zeng devotes to questions of
foreign policy and security (North Korea, Taiwan) is not indirectly the product of his
unpopularity on the domestic stage. Similarly, this unpopularity and the fears aroused
by his ambitiousness could explain his long silence during the SARS epidemic, a silence
that he broke at the end of April in a statement to the CCP’s Central School, of which he
is the new Director19. Be that as it may, despite the constraints of the present political
system, the outcome of  this  election has helped,  if  not  to  weaken,  then at  least  to
discredit a little further the dominant position of Jiang and his allies and cronies within
the country’s central authorities.
The Central Military Commission
20 It  was  hardly  likely  that  the  State  Central  Military  Commission  (SCMC)  would be
different from the Party Central Military Commission (PCMC): consequently, dashing
the  hopes  of  some  observers,  the  PCMC  formed  last  November  was  automatically
transformed  into  the  SCMC  once  the  deputies  had  approved  Jiang’s  election  as  its
chairman on March 15th, and the following day, at his instigation, had elected the three
vice-chairmen and the four members of this body (see Table 4).
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Table 3: State Presidency, Supreme court and Procurate
NB: The President and Vice-President of the Republic’s election took place on March 15th 2003. The
Supreme Court President’and Procurator General’s election took place on March 16th 2003. The
number of valid ballots was 2,944 for the State President’s election, 2,945 for the State Vice-
President’s election, 2,895 for the Supreme Court President’s election and 2,938 for the Procurator
General’s election. Percentages were calculated by the Chinese authorities on the basis of the number
of valid ballots.
Source: Wenhuibao, March 16th 2003, pA1, and March 17th 2003, p.A18.
21 As is known, according to the internal document Disidai (The Fourth Generation), Hu
ought to have succeeded Jiang at the head of these two commissions in November and
March respectively20. As is also known, nothing came of this, either because the author
of the document, known under the pseudonym of Zong Hairen, was not informed of the
highly sensitive and therefore top secret negotiations surrounding the succession to
Jiang, or because Jiang himself later went back on a decision that was still at the draft
stage, or again because this option had been proposed by Jiang with the sole purpose of
testing out his peers and of estimating the support he would need to keep his position.
And it is known, finally, that the plans made in 1998-1999 to set up a National Security
Council (NSC) better placed to manage international crises, of which Jiang was to have
been chairman, while probably staying on as chairman of the CMC, were provisionally
dropped in 2002. They led only—probably after NATO planes had bombed the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade in May 1999—to the creation of a CCP leading group for national
security  (guojia  anquan lingdao  xiaozu),  a  flexible  and  provisional  structure  aimed
mainly at handling international crises and at co-ordinating decision-making in the
diplomatic,  military  and  energy  fields.  Headed  by  Jiang,  this  leading  group  then
brought  together,  according  to  some sources,  several  high-ranking  civilian  leaders,
among them Zhu Rongji, Hu Jintao, Wei Jianxing, the head of the Party’s disciplinary
apparatus, Qian Qichen, then vice-premier in charge of foreign affairs, Zeng Qinghong
(Secretary  General)  and  Liu  Huaqiu,  director  of  the  government’s  Foreign  Affairs
Bureau21. The difficulties encountered in defining the relative mandates of the NSC and
the CMC, Jiang’s persistent refusal to hand over the presidency of the CMC to Hu, the
problem  of  introducing  a  fundamental  reform  of  decision-making  authorities  in
matters  of  external  security  at  such  a  politically  delicate  time:  these  difficulties
combined to torpedo the whole project—at least for the present. At all events, in the
course of summer 2002, Jiang forced the Party leadership to keep him on as chairman
of the CMC. Then, a fortnight before the Party Congress, against all expectations, he
forced his main detractor within the leadership, Li Ruihuan (chairman of the CPPCC
and number four in the regime) to retire aged 68. Li,  as we have seen, was to have
succeeded Li Peng as chairman of the NPC. With this stroke, Jiang removed the last
(modest) obstacle to his renewal as head of the CMC.
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22 Some Army delegates to the NPC declared that, on the eve of the Party Congress, Jiang
proposed to the military chiefs—and probably to the CMC—that he would stand down.
The  chiefs  are  said  to  have  refused on the  grounds  of  his  “good understanding of
military and international affairs”. This information, not very believable, was released
to the public in an attempt to justify Jiang’s poor election results (see Table and below).
These deputies’ comments served above all to strengthen the notion that, as regards
the CMC leadership, the legitimacy of the military hierarchy had been more important
than that of the civilian representatives of the Party22.  And one can easily see with
hindsight that all this apparent uncertainty over Jiang’s departure from the CMC was
no  more  than  tactical  posturing.  Indeed,  other  and  better  sources  support  the
hypothesis that Jiang fully intended to stay on. They say on the contrary that, towards
the end of the 16th Congress, on November 13 th, Jiang asked General Zhang Wannian,
outgoing  vice-chairman  of  the  CMC,  to  submit  to  the  Standing  Committee  of  the
Congress Presidium meeting in Zhongnanhai a motion proposing to extend his term as
chairman of the CMC. This motion had already been signed by a score of leaders, all
from  the  military.  Zhang  particularly  asked  Hu  to  give  his  opinion  after  several
members of the former leadership, such as Li Lanqing, and retired servicemen such as
General Liu Huaqing, had approved the proposal: with his back to the wall, Hu could
only  follow suit.  The  Standing  Committee  of  the  Congress  Presidium,  being  mostly
made up of Jiang’s associates, was obviously bound to back the decision, despite the
opposition of  several  leaders  in  retirement,  or  close  to  it,  who were also  members
(including Li Ruihuan, Wei Jianxing and Wan Li)23. Yet, the initiative—deliberately kept
secret from all outside the narrow circle of those in power and probably disclosed only
to the Politburo—caught many delegates at the 16th Congress off their guard; and they
resented it; if they had been consulted—which they were not—perhaps the support for
keeping Jiang in his post would not have been so decisive24. 
 
Table 4: State Central Military Commission
NB: The SCMC Chairman’s election took place on March 16th 2003. The SCMP Vice-Chairmen’and
member’s election took place on March 16th 2003. The number of valid ballots was 2,946 for the
Chairman’s election and 2,937 for the Vice-Chairmen’and member’s election. Percentages were
calculated by the Chinese authorities on the basis of the number of valid ballots.
Source: Wenhuibao, March 16th 2003, pA1, and March 17th 2003, p.A18.
23 The results of the election of the SCMC are in some way the proof of this, after the
event.  Although  the  two  congresses  are  distinct,  they  are  largely  interconnected:
indeed, the delegates to the Party Congress and to the National People’s Congress are
often the same national and local leaders—it would be helpful to know precisely the
ratio, but one may estimate it at two to one.
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24 It so happened that, of the 2,946 deputies present for the vote, more than 200 refused to
support Jiang’s election (92.53% voted yes). What is more, 36 deputies asked for Hu to
take  over,  while  two others  wrote  Zhu Rongji’s  name on their  ballot  papers25.  The
following day, by contrast, Hu was re-elected as vice-chairman of the SCMC with an
overwhelming majority of the votes cast (99.69%). The other members of the SCMC, all
from the military, encountered no real opposition. The few “no” votes and additional
abstentions were directed against sitting generals (and the oldest of them) and are not
really significant.
25 Can this vote speed up Jiang’s departure from the Commission? Probably not. Only the
true intentions of the man concerned, and his capacity to continue imposing them on
the rest of the Party’s new leadership—he has at least five allies (out of nine members)
in  the  Politburo’s  new  Standing  Committee—could  shorten  a  term  that  is  fixed  in
principle at five years (2003-2008). Between 1989 and 1999, Jiang was the only civilian
to sit on the CMC. Since then, his successor has been at his side. This arrangement may
be seen as transitory26. But one is also entitled to think that it will serve as a precedent
for another succession model, whereby Hu would become, at the moment accepted by
Jiang and the majority of the leadership,  chairman of the CMC and Zeng, the Vice-
President of the republic, would succeed him as first vice-chairman of the
Commission27. . .
26 In other words, the field is still open.
The Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate
27 The Supreme Court and the Supreme Procuratorate are formally required to report on
their work to the NPC; and, as usual, they have been subjected to sharp criticism, not
only by what one might call the “pro-security” group in the Congress but also by a
large number of delegates concerned about the powerlessness and malfunctioning of
these two institutions, the second in particular28. 
28 As regards the election of their head, the situation in the Court looked different from
that in the Procuratorate. Xiao Yang, president of the Supreme Court since 1998, was
asking for his term to be extended for a further period of five years. By contrast, Han
Zhubin, the incompetent General Procurator—before 1998 he was Railways Minister—
was retiring after a single term, handing over to Jia Chunwang, the former Minister of
State Security (1993-1998) and Public Security (1998-2002).
29 Xiao Yang,  Minister  of  Justice  before 1998 and a  good lawyer,  was  re-elected with,
broadly  speaking,  an honourable  score  (95.37%)  considering the  vigorous  criticisms
levelled at the poor functioning of the courts29. As for Jia (95.54%), he was the target of
an opposition vote—admittedly a less angry opposition than his predecessor had faced
(a 65% “yes” vote in 1998) but still a significant one within the Chinese context, based
probably on his background as former boss of the secret services and then of the police
and on the active role he had played in repressing Falungong: these were qualifications
that had prepared him more for repression than for defending the rights of those faced
with prosecution.
The State Council
30 The re-election of the leaders of the central government was much less controversial.
As he had agreed to do in 1998, Zhu Rongji (74 years old), the Premier, was retiring
after  a  single  term  in  office  (according  to  the  Constitution,  he  could,  like  his
predecessor, Li Peng, have claimed a second term). Zhu’s chosen successor, Wen Jiabao,
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is not among Jiang’s associates. Having, until the Tiananmen massacre, worked closely
with  Zhao  Ziyang  in  the  Party’s  Central  Secretariat,  Wen  survived  the  political
buffeting  following  that  crisis,  more  because  of  his  low  factional  colouration  than
because of the self-criticism he agreed to undertake or the low profile that he kept for
several years30. He was promoted to vice-premier in 1998 by Zhu, who had previously
entrusted him with agricultural affairs; then, from 2000 onwards, Zhu preferred him as
his successor over two of Jiang’s favourites: Wu Bangguo, treacherously sacrificed by
Zhu who gave him the “mission impossible” of reforming the state enterprises, and Li
Changchun, criticised over his management of Guangdong. Wen is a consensus man
with a calm and controlled voice, preferring to appear close to the people, particularly
those  left  behind by  growth;  he  is  strengthened by  his  experience  of  China’s  poor
regions,  particularly  Gansu;  and  he  is  well-liked  beyond  official  circles.  But  it  is
significant that he is popular too within these circles! And the vote he won at the NPC,
at the time of his election as head of government on March 16th, tends to demonstrate
this: in fact, he registered an even higher level of support than had his predecessor
(99.35% as against 98%), whose trenchant and sometimes authoritarian character later
attracted much ill-feeling.
 
Table 5: The State Council
Incumbent minister. All other ofﬁcials were promoted in March 2003 ٭ 
New or restructures commission or ministry ٭٭ 
Zhang was dismissed on April 20th 2003 and was replaced by Vice-Premier Wu Yi.
(2) Zhou XiaoChuan was appointed in December 2002.
NB: The Premier’s election took place on March 16th 2003. The number of valid ballots was 2,925. The
other members of the State Council were elected on March 17th 2003. The number valid ballots was
2,935. Percentages were calculated by the Chinese authorities on the basis of the number of valid
ballots.
Sources: Wenhuibao, March 17th 2003, p.A18; Mingbao 18th 2003, p.A22.
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Table 6: The leadership of the CPPCC
.Incumbent members of the CPPCC leadership ٭ 
NB: The CPPCC Chairmanship’s election took place on March 13th 2003. 2,152 delegates took part in
it. The number of valid ballots was 2,145. Percentages were calculated by the Chinese authorities on
the basis of the number of valid ballots. In March 2003, the number of Vice-Chairmen was cut from 31
to 24; 13 of them are non-CCP ﬁgures(against 16 in 1998) and 11 are CCP members (against 15 in
1998).
Sources: Mingbao, March 14th 2003, p.A19; Wenhuibao, March 11th 2003, p.A4.
31 The next day, the elections were held for the other seats on the State Council (SC): the
four vice-premiers, the five State Councillors including the Secretary General (these
nine leaders, together with the Premier, making up the Executive Committee of the SC),
as well as the 28 commission chairmen and ministers of a new central government that
is slightly reduced in size (one commission fewer). Here again, while most of the new
cabinet members were elected without any hitches, there were still a few surprises left
for us (see Table 5). Having had his fingers burned by his own and Zeng’s poor results,
Jiang is said to have asked Wu Bangguo to mobilise the delegates, who—as we have seen
—mostly belong to the Party and are subject to its voting discipline31. Or so we might
have thought. Once again, those leaders most clearly associated with Jiang were openly
challenged.  Thus  it  was  with  Huang  Ju  (97.75%),  the  former  boss  of  Shanghai
(1994-2002) and the conqueror in spring 2002 of the popular (at least among foreign
businessmen) Xu Kuangdi;  Huang replaced Li Lanqing as first vice-premier, his post
being “formal”, that is to say, without specific duties beyond monitoring Wen on Jiang’s
behalf32.  This was also the treatment handed out by deputies to Chen Zhili (87.80%),
another  member of  the  “Shanghai  gang”—she had directed the Party’s  Propaganda
Bureau  there  during  the  1990s;  Chen  was  promoted  in  1998,  despite  her  lack  of
competence, to the post of education minister and then state councillor responsible for
education and culture. The new and powerful Secretary General of the State Council,
Hua Jianmin, who they say is Jiang’s watcher there, also won a lower than average vote
The 10th National People’s Congress and After
China Perspectives, 47 | May-june 2003
12
(94%):  having been in charge of  economic planning in Shanghai  at  the start  of  the
1990s,  Hua was called to Peking by Jiang,  who had him named as deputy Secretary
General of the Party’s powerful leading group in charge of finance and the economy33.
Tang Jiaxuan, who succeeded Qian Qichen as state councillor responsible for foreign
policy, may also be included in this category.
32 Among the ministers, the election of two men close to Jiang and Zeng Qinghong—Zhang
Wenkang and Wang Xudong—was disputed to  some extent.  Zhang,  formerly  Jiang’s
personal (military) doctor and minister of health since 1998, scored among the worst
results of any of the 28 ministers (96.15% and in 27th position). Despite the active and
positive role that he played in lifting the veil of secrecy and ignorance surrounding the
Aids  epidemic  in  Henan arising  from blood  transfusions,  Zhang  was  probably here
paying the price for his privileged relationship with the former secretary general. He
was to pay an even heavier price on April 20th when he was dismissed from his post
following the spread of the SARS epidemic in Peking, for having too long faithfully
pursued a mendacious and even criminal policy dictated by the highest bodies in the
Party,  a  policy that  only the pressure from the World Health Organisation and the
constraints of globalisation were eventually able to challenge.
33 As for Wang Xudong (96.97% “yes” vote, in 26th position), his relatively weak result is
probably due as much to his poor knowledge of the important and sensitive sector—the
information industry—that he is now responsible for as to his close connections with
Zeng Qinghong34. 
34 On the other hand, those close to Zhu Rongji, such as Wu Yi, who became after April
20th the  super  co-ordinator  of  the  struggle  against  this  same  SARS  epidemic  and
(provisional)  minister  of  health,  or  Ma  Kai,  the  chairman  of  the  big  new  State
Development and Reform Commission, were not subjected to any noticeable opposition.
The only Zhu supporter to have been somewhat challenged was Zhou Xiaochuan, the
new governor of the People’s Bank of China, who scored the second worst result after
Huang Ju. For this, two explanations may be offered. On the one hand, it is possible that
a  certain  number  of  deputies  bore  a  grudge  against  Zhou  for  his  management—
unprofitable for the shareholders—of the Securities Regulatory Commission which he
directed from 2000 to 2002. On the other hand, despite his good relations with Zhu,
Zhou is also close to Jiang: his father, Zhou Jiannan, was in fact the direct superior of
the future Chinese number one, when Jiang was working in the Ministry of Mechanical
Industry . . .
35 That said, while the State Council includes only about one-third of ministers close to
Jiang, its Standing Committee, that is to say, its leading body, is still dominated by Jiang
supporters. Wen has only Wu Yi for an ally there. Apart from Huang Ju, Hua Jianmin
and Chen Zhili,  Jiang can also count on Zeng Peiyan,  Hui Liangyu,  Zhou Yongkang,
General  Cao  Gangchuan,  the  new  defence  minister,  and  Tang  Jiaxuan  to  bend  this
body’s  decision-making—mainly  in  the  social  and  economic  area—in  his  preferred
direction. Indeed, Zeng Peiyan—who is a former president of the State Commission on
Development and the Plan (1998-2003) and now the State Council’s overall co-ordinator
of financial and economic affairs—worked closely with Jiang in the electronics industry.
Hui was Party secretary in Jiangsu up until December 2002 and is now in charge of
agricultural  questions  in  the  SC;  his  abilities  are  recognised  and  his  fruitful
collaboration with Zhu and Wen is confirmed. Nevertheless, Hui is also increasingly
perceived as belonging to the Zeng Qinghong faction, which is said to have advanced
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his career, as is the case with a good third of the new Politburo members: Liu Yushan
(Propaganda),  He  Guoqiang  (Organisation),  Wang  Gang  (General  Affairs),  Zhang
Deqiang (Guangdong), Chen Liangyu (Shanghai) and Zhou Yongkang (Public Security)35.
Admittedly,  the  new  minister  of  public  security  and  ex-boss  of  Sichuan,  Zhou
Yongkang, must also have given some assurances to the Li Peng faction to attain that
post and above all, in December 2002, the position of secretary (head) of the Party’s
powerful Political and Legal Commission, formerly occupied by Luo Gan, a supporter of
Li36. But this promotion would not have been possible without the approval of Jiang,
who appreciated his efficient crackdown on Falungong in Sichuan, and without the
active support of Zeng Qinghong, whose relationship with Zhou dates from their time
together in the oil industry, then controlled by Yu Qiuli. Moreover, according to some
sources, Zhou is brother-in-law to Zeng, whose younger sister he married in 198137. 
36 Lastly, Wu Yi and another third of the new ministers are closer to Zhu Rongji than to
Wen or even to Hu Jintao.  In a politico-institutional  context such as this,  Wen had
scarcely any choice but to rely on Wu Yi to direct the battle against SARS. And, more
generally, he will have to strengthen his alliance with those ministers still loyal to Zhu
if he wishes the State Council to back the reforms that he, in collaboration with Hu, will
be formulating38. The election results of March 16th and 17th will probably encourage
Wen to consolidate the partnership he has formed with the new Secretary General-
President. They will also have warned him against possible counter-attacks by Jiang
and his supporters39. 
 
Annex 1: The leadership of the CCP after the 16th Congress (November 2002)
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Annex 2: The central leadership of the CCP and the functions of its members
The CPPCC
37 Two-thirds of the CPPCC is made up of non-communists and individuals from what one
could call “official civil society”: it is a sort of Chinese upper house whose consultative
role is particularly limited; it  symbolises the united front between the CCP and the
eight “democratic parties” which are strongly represented on it; and it also acts once a
year as a loudspeaker for the country’s problems. The CPPCC’s members are chosen by
the Party’s United Front Department, whose director is always vice-chairman of this
body (today Liu Yandong) and its real number two. The membership brings together
personalities as diverse as the writer Ba Jin, the pro-communist Hong Kong millionaire
Henry Fok and the actress Gong Li, who is much photographed at every annual meeting
of this conference. 
38 As  demanded  by  the  protocol  of  the  Party-state,  the  number  four  of  the  Standing
Committee of the Politburo and of the regime, Jia Qinglin, was therefore appointed as
chairman,  in  succession  to  the  unfortunate  Li  Ruihuan.  Li,  unlike  other  outgoing
members of the Chinese leadership, was not authorised to propose his own successor40.
Jia’s promotion to the Party’s supreme leadership and his nomination as head of the
10th CPPCC (2,238  members)  did  not  pass  without  attracting  considerable  criticism
both in China and abroad: indeed, considering that the CPPCC is China’s most open
institution to the world beyond the Party and the country’s elites, what message did
Jiang Zemin intend to convey by promoting as its chairman an ally who is among those
most  strongly  suspected of  corruption? Jia  was  CCP secretary in  Fujian (1996-2000)
where, moreover, his wife, Lin Youfang, was in charge of the province’s external trade,
at the time of the great Yuanhua smuggling scandal—which cost the state six billion US
dollars.  Jiang promoted him to number one in Peking, wanting to build up his own
support in the capital. Though he protected Jia when those responsible for the illegal
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trade were incriminated (among them Li Jizhou, the former deputy minister of public
security,  and  Lai  Changxin,  the  crooked  businessman  who  fled  to  Canada),  Jia’s
reputation in China is nevertheless bad. For this reason, his election as president of the
CPPCC, on March 13th, was awaited with some impatience.
39 The outcome of that election was not as negative as some had hoped and others feared.
It  is  true that,  with 92.77% of the votes cast (1,990 out of  2,152),  Jia was the worst
elected of all this body’s leaders—with the exception of Ba Jin whose great age (he is 98)
and infirmity probably explains his poor showing (90.26%, see Table 6). But Jia was in
the end better elected than Zeng and practically as well as Jiang. Being composed of
more non-communists, was the CPPCC more indulgent towards Jia than the NPC would
have been? It is difficult to say41. One is inclined to think that much less was at stake
than in Zeng’s election. Jia, who is 62, is still a protégé of Jiang, but his transfer to the
CPPCC is seen more as an honourable retirement accorded to a loyal follower than as a
springboard to greater responsibilities.
40 Some members of the CPPCC leadership were, on the other hand, better elected: the
unfortunate ex-Mayor of Shanghai, Xu Kuangdi, the former secretary general of Zhu
Rongji’s  government,  Wang  Zongyu,  the  new  president  of  the  Academy  of  Social
Sciences, Chen Kuiyuan, and even Liu Yandong, the Party’s watchdog in the CPPCC.
So what?
41 They say that these results threw Jiang into a fit of anger that lasted for three days.
Despite the narrow margin between the voting results for his supporters, on the one
hand, and for his detractors, on the other, the message appeared particularly clear.
Jiang blamed “outside interference”, and the pernicious spreading of the idea of the
“Shanghai  gang”:  he  considered  this  untrue,  despite  the  obvious  favouritism  that
benefited those leaders who had worked with him in that city42. Next, he is said to have
asked the Central Secretariat of the Party—in particular Liu Yunshang, He Guoqiang
and Wang Gang,  three  of  Zeng Qinghong’s  people,  to  build  up favourable  publicity
about the badly elected leaders, especially about Zeng Qinghong, Jia Qinglin, Huang Ju
and Chen Zhili43. For what it is worth, this instruction has helped to widen the fault
lines  that  these  elections  allowed to  appear.  It  does  not  augur  well  for  the  Party’s
capacity to remain united until the next NPC in 2008; and, in the long run, it might alter
the  new  distribution  of  responsibilities  that  was  proposed  during  the  16th  Party
Congress and then confirmed at the meetings of the NPC and the CPPCC. Yet, at the
same time, these elections reflect some degree of institutionalisation in the present
political system.
A new distribution of responsibilities
42 The most important implication to be drawn from these meetings is that Jiang Zemin is
still  the Chinese number one and that his supporters dominate the main centres of
power in the Party and the state. However, this obvious truth must immediately be
qualified, not only because of the complaints and objections among the deputies but
also, and most particularly, in light of the distribution of tasks among the country’s top
leaders.
43 While Jiang’s prerogatives in the strategic and foreign policy fields remain significant,
in domestic affairs it is the duo of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao that is in the ascendancy.
Of this the handling of the SARS epidemic is, as we shall see, a clear illustration.
44 Officially, it is Hu, in his capacity as President of the republic and above all as Secretary
General of the CCP, who directs the formation and implementation of China’s foreign
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policy. In fact, since March 16th, it is he that picks up the phone when a foreign head of
government seeks to communicate quickly and at the highest level with the Chinese
leadership44. And it is recognised that Hu has also gradually won the chairmanship of
the Party’s  major leading groups dealing with foreign affairs,  including the one on
national security, the one on Taiwan and the one on foreign policy. 
45 Be that as it may, the make-up of these leading groups betrays the strong presence,
even the domination, of Jiang’s associates. Thus it is with the leading group national
security. After the NPC, Zeng Qinhong was promoted to be vice-chairman of the leading
group on national  security,  of  which he had before  been Secretary General.  In  the
absence of the National Security Council (see above), this leading group is a body for
debating  and  decision-making  whose  role  deserves  close  attention45.  This  structure
could enable Hu to establish more quickly and firmly his role in the field of external
security.  In  the longer term, it  might be transformed into a  new National  Security
Council  and supplant the Central  Military Commission,  especially  when it  comes to
managing international crises—obviously after Jiang has agreed to retire, perhaps half
way between the 16th and 17th Party Congresses. But Hu would have at the same time to
keep in check Zeng’s influence in the foreign and security policy realm.
46 As for Zeng, with Jiang behind him and wielding his constitutional prerogatives as vice-
president—assisting the President in his work (article 82)—he has globally tried to keep
his powers in the fields of foreign affairs and security, in particular on Asian questions,
such as the dispute between North Korea and the US46.  Nevertheless, since late May
2003, Zeng’s influence in this area has decreased. For instance, since then, he does not
belong any more to the leading group on Taiwan of which he was reported of being
vice-chairman after the NPC meeting: now chaired by Hu and not by Jiang any more,
this  group’s  vice-chairman  is  Jia  Qinglin,  the  CPPCC  chairman,  a  probably  less
competing deputy, while as before two military men sit in it, Guo Boxiong and deputy
chief  of  staff  Xiong  Guangkai47.  More  importantly,  since  early  June,  it  has  been
confirmed that Hu had succeeded Jiang as head of the CCP leading group on foreign
affairs; and while Premier Wen Jiabao is now vice-head, and members include Vice-
Premier Wu Yi, State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan and Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, Zeng
does not sit any more in it48.
47 Now that Jiang Zemin has left most of these leading groups (except perhaps the one on
the policy towards the US), he will still be able to exert his leadership, in two ways. On
the one hand, his position as president of the CMC enables him to maintain a direct
hold  over  the  Army  and  to  “listen  to  the  politics  behind  the  guns”  (chuiqiang
tingzheng) to borrow the phrase used in a Xinbao article49. And, since the 16th Party
Congress, he is officially kept informed of all the debates within the Politburo (and its
Standing Committee) and is still consulted on important decisions—and we can imagine
that they are not taken without his approval50.  On the other hand, Jiang relies on a
number of trusted leaders to exert his control over the new duo in power. Zeng is the
most important of these in the field of international policy but Jia Qinglin is another
one to watch. 
48 For instance, it is worth indicating that Zeng has some contacts in the PLA that might
help him to increase his influence in strategic and military affairs. Zeng is the son of
Zeng Shan (1899-1972), a former official of the Jiangxi Soviet who became minister of
transport during the 1960s, and of Deng Liujin (born in 1911), one of the few women to
have taken part in the Long March: Zeng was born to power. He was educated at the
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Peking Institute of Technology, began his career in the weapons industry, then moved
up under the protection of Yu Qiuli, who headed the Political Department of the PLA
during the 1980s. They say it was Zeng who, during the 1990s, helped Jiang to establish
good relations with top military leaders and to persuade Deng Xiaoping to get rid of the
Yang brothers (Yang Shangkun et Yang Baibing). Moreover, Zeng’s family is still doing
well  in  the  Army:  his  sister,  Major  General  Zeng  Haisheng,  and  his  two  younger
brothers are all career officers. Zeng arranged for his sister to be elected to the NPC;
and today she is director of the department of general affairs of the general staff, a key
post that Zeng himself may find useful in the future51.
49 Consequently, for the foreseeable future, Hu Jintao and his allies will find the assertion
of  their  power  in  foreign  and  military  affairs  somewhat  impeded  in  spite  of  the
stronger profile Hu has developed after his trip to Russia and his participation in the G8
summit in Evian (France) in June 2003 and its gradual control of the CCP leading groups
dealing with foreign and security questions. That does not mean, if Hu’s hands were
freer in these areas, that he would introduce important changes. One may think that,
on the main subjects—relations with the United States, Japan, Taiwan, North Korea,
Iraq, G8—a wide convergence of views continues to exist, and results in a foreign policy
that is ironically more accomodating towards Washington than France’s or Germany’s.
And this consensus helps to lessen the power struggle that has become visible in this
field. Yet, the struggle really does exist and in the long run may lead to open conflict.
50 In domestic affairs, the situation seems more clearly propitious for the Hu-Wen team;
and  it  will  probably  be  on  this  ground  that  the  latter  will  try  to  strengthen  its
influence, as was shown by the way the SARS epidemic was handled. 
51 Admittedly, as we have seen, Jiang’s supporters dominate the highest authorities and
Zeng’s role is equally important there. Thus, most Politburo members (about 17 out of
25),  and  most  members  of  its  Standing  Committee  (at  least  five—Wu  Bangguo,  Jia
Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju and Li Changchun—out of nine), are close to Jiang.
These leaders often also have direct links with Zeng. And these are the bodies that
make  the  most  important  decisions.  While  their  meetings  are  not  always  publicly
announced,  partially  re-establishing  a  policy  adopted  in  1987  by  Zhao  Ziyang  and
abandoned  after  Tiananmen,  they  have  been  so  more  often  since  the  16th Party
Congress, which tends to suggest a greater frequency. Since Hu and Wen do not seek to
cut themselves off from the rest of Chinese leaders, their interest lies in getting these
bodies to take on as many decisions as possible, in particular by systematising their
voting  procedures.  But  Jiang’s  continuing influence  helps  to  limit  their  margin  for
manoeuvre. 
52 Yet, apart from Zeng and, to a lesser extent, Li Changchun, the new propaganda chief,
Jiang’s other allies in the Standing Committee do not hold “strategic” responsibilities.
And Zeng’s powers are concentrated inside the apparatus of the Party, which in China
is not responsible for economic or social affairs. Unlike other Party-states of the Soviet
type, the Central Committee of the CCP has no departments in these sectors and the
CCP economic leading groups are dominated by government leaders (communists, of
course). As number two on the Central Secretariat, Zeng dominates it by his activitism
and  by  the  number  of  his  allies.  On  the  one  hand,  he  directly  supervises  the
organisation sector, that is to say, the promotion and training of senior cadres. In this
capacity, as we have seen, he has been since 2002 the director of the Party’s Central
School. On the other hand, among the Central Committee’s six other secretaries, he has
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at least four allies: He Guoqiang, in charge of organisation, Liu Yunshan, of propaganda,
Zhou Yongkang, of the police and justice, and Wang Gang of co-ordination. In other
words, Zeng’s domain recalls that of Qiao Shi, a powerful CCP leader forced by Jiang to
retire in 1997. Does that mean he is doomed to fail?
53 In  the  field  of  economic  and  social  policy,  the  influence  of  Jiang,  Zeng  and  their
supporters is more limited; rather, it is counterbalanced by the promotion of numerous
collaborators of Zhu Rongji, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, mainly within the State Council.
These are the fields where problems are the most urgent, where popular expectations
are the greatest and where relations between the leadership and society need to be
most delicately handled. One might extend this conclusion to the governing teams in
the provinces. Last winter, during the great government reshuffle, no fewer than 13
secretaries of provinces (or big cities) and 19 governors (or mayors) were promoted.
And most of these are associates of Hu and, to a lesser extent, of Wen52. Among them
was Meng Xuenong, Peking’s brand new mayor—appointed last December—who was
sacrificed, on April  20th,  by a leadership anxious to rebuild some confidence among
people hard hit by SARS and eager—above all—to convince Jiang Zemin into sacking the
health minister.
54 This price was relatively worth paying, in that the spread of SARS in northern China
has given Hu and Wen the chance to strengthen their hold over the Party and the state.
In the front line against the epidemic, Hu, Wen and Wu Yi were able on April 17th to
impose a change of policy on the Politburo, persuading it to stop falsifying data and
deliberately misinforming the public and instead to adopt a more transparent attitude
and to mobilise all available medical resources, whether civilian or military. When the
Standing Committee of the Politburo voted on April 18th, only Zeng Qinhong, Huang Ju
and Jia Qinglin (the worst elected candidates at the NPC and the CPPCC!) abstained,
seeing that these decisions gave the advantage to Hu and Wen. The six other members
approved Hu’s proposals: they included Wu Bangguo, Li Changchun, Luo Gan and Wu
Guangzheng. And at the subsequent emergency meeting of the Politburo, 18 out of 24
members voted “yes”,  while  four abstained and only two voted against:  Liu Qi,  the
Peking secretary, who would have had to bear the responsibility on Meng Xuenong’s
behalf and had just had to make a public self-criticism, and Zeng Peiyan, another of
Jiang’s supporters53. 
55 It  is  probable  that  the  pressure  from the  World  Health  Organisation,  from foreign
businessmen settled in China and from the international community would in any case
have  overcome  the  old,  Soviet-style  bureaucratic  reflexes  of  the  Party  apparatus.
However, the popularity that Hu and Wen had demonstrated during the NPC meeting
was—at least provisionally—swelled by the extra legitimacy conferred by this sudden
change of course. By contrast, the prolonged silence of Jiang and his supporters helped
to deepen the mistrust with which they were viewed within Chinese society. This is
why, shortly after April 17th, one after another—Jiang, Zeng, Huang Ju, Jia Qinglin—they
spoke out, not so much to support the mobilisation against SARS but to remind the
front line leaders of their presence and their powers.
56 In the end, the success of the authorities in this battle will not only be based on the
degree of transparency or compassion that they have showed: it will largely arise from
the  state’s  capacity  to  improve  its  governance  and  to  co-ordinate  action  by  its
administrative systems, which too often, in the field of health as in others, resemble a
set of ineradicable and fundamentally selfish feudal bureaucracies.
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Towards an uneasy cohabitation?
57 The distribution of tasks, referred to above, cannot mask the growing rivalries within
the “fourth generation” of the Chinese communists. For the time being, these rivalries
have less to do with the choice of policies or of which reforms to pursue than with
seizing control of the main levers of power. 
58 The way in which the battle against SARS was fought might give grounds for believing
that the regime is changing, that it is using this mobilisation to accelerate political
reforms  that,  in  other  circumstances,  would  have  been  put  off  until  later.  One  is
entitled to doubt this optimistic, Chernobyl-style, scenario.
59 The Chinese leadership that emerged from the 16th Party Congress and then from the
10th National Party Congress did not propose deep political reforms. Once again, its
reforms are administrative and all  tend towards improving governance,  controlling
corruption  and  strengthening  channels  for  communicating  with  society  and,  in
particular, with its elites54. The election of citizens’ committees (jumin weiyuanhui) has
already  been  tried  out  here  and  there  and  is  expected  to  be  implemented  more
generally; but it is not likely to shake the foundations of the system55. Separating the
administrative powers of decision-making, enforcement and control (quanli  sanfen),
under the direction of Party committees, has been tested out in Shenzhen, with the aim
of  curbing  corruption;  but  it  is  not  likely  to  produce  any  interplay  of  checks  and
balances or to make the civil servants less greedy56. Thanks to SARS, the media have
enjoyed  a  greater  margin  for  manoeuvre;  but  this  must  be  seen  in  the  context  of
newspaper  closures  and suspensions  that  were  decided shortly  before  by  the  same
leadership team. Greater transparency has been observed—and was illustrated in April
by the unexpected reports on the accidental death of a submarine crew of the Chinese
navy—but it was not spontaneous: it was directed and controlled. In other words, the
media  continue  to  be  called  upon  to  exercise  a  critical  role  when  and  where  the
leadership asks them to.  Hu has showed a willingness to better promote the rights
enshrined  in  the  Constitution  and  open  up  the  election  of  local  state  officials57.
Moreover,  some newspapers,  apparently protected by Hu Jintao and his allies,  have
used  SARS  to  ask  for  more  extensive  reforms  of  the  political  and  administrative
system58. But when, at the beginning of May, Hu restored to favour Jiang’s theory of the
“three representations”, it reminded these critics that the Hu-Wen duo does not intend
to widen the divisions that have come to light within the Party leadership. Since Hu
and Wen took over their posts, we have witnessed what is above all a change of style in
communication, and perhaps in governance. This evolution has indeed been speeded
up by SARS. But it has not led to other, deeper changes. In short, although one may be
entitled, for the reasons put forward earlier, to give the Hu-Wen duo the benefit of the
doubt, it has not yet demonstrated its will to introduce any real or serious political
reforms. 
60 For  all  that,  might  the  hidden  power  struggle  that  is  being  fought  out  today  be
transformed into a trial of strength? We may consider that, for the foreseeable future,
the  answer  must  remain  no.  Indeed,  the  relative  weakness  of  the  political
disagreements separating the present leaders helps to minimise this risk.  And both
camps need stability too much to throw themselves into such an adventure. On the one
hand, Jiang and his supporters know that it would be difficult for them to push the
Party into any break with Hu or even with Wen. As we have seen, knowing that the cost
of any change of successor would be too high, Jiang has preferred to surround them, at
The 10th National People’s Congress and After
China Perspectives, 47 | May-june 2003
20
the  head  of  the  Party  and  of  the  government,  with  a  considerable  number  of  his
supporters. And they, Zeng in particular, being aware of their unpopularity within the
apparatus, have become very discreet about the internal democratisation of the Party,
an issue more recently  taken up by Hu himself.  Conversely,  Hu and Wen have not
consolidated their powers enough to launch themselves into an attempt to weaken the
Jiang faction or, in particular, Zeng’s collaborators, who have become a sub-group that
will merit closer scrutiny.
61 Putting it another way, while Jiang cannot hope in the coming years to replace Hu with
Zeng, Hu will again have to show patience and maintain a firm coalition with Wen, the
associates of  Zhu Rongji  and the provincial  leaders  whom he has  promoted59.  That
alone will help him to consolidate his power. The support of the NPC deputies and more
widely  of  the  “official  elites”  will  not  be  enough,  although he  has  worn down the
domination of Jiang’s supporters and above all cooled their arrogance.
Has the regime become institutionalised?
62 The smooth transfer  of  power  from Jiang  to  Hu,  before  it  was  even accomplished,
aroused  an interesting  discussion  about  whether  the  Chinese  political  regime  was
becoming institutionalised60. Did this spring’s developments, which we have just briefly
examined,  help  to  accelerate  this  process?  Or,  on the contrary,  is  an authoritarian
political system still incompatible with institutionalisation?
63 Any system of  whatever  kind will  produce  its  own standards;  and the  difficulty  in
China, as elsewhere, is to keep them respected despite the constraints and political
interests in play. It is a fact that, in an authoritarian system, these standards are fewer,
looser,  easier to circumvent and above all  non-democratic:  co-optation remains the
basic  mechanism  of  leaders’  selection61.  However,  as  observers  have  noticed,  the
Chinese  Party-state  does  now  submit  more  often  to  practices  and  procedures—
especially votes and elections—which are regarded, by the regime’s leaders themselves,
as being quite important. The economic and legal reforms, the openness to the outside
world and the profound changes within Chinese society have also obliged the Party’s
leaders to respect the rules they have set for themselves. And one would be tempted to
add that the intensity of the quarrels that are racking them today helps to increase
their dependence on these standards.
64 But can one conclude that  handing over the levers of  power,  of  supreme power in
particular,  is  mainly  in  obedience to  these  standards?  On the contrary,  the  way in
which the 16th Party Congress unfolded, and the selection of leaders for the Party’s
“state façade”, tend to show that these rules give structure to the balance of forces and
to the political struggles being fought—but they do not determine the outcome. Some
might be tempted to extend this observation to democracies. Yet, the Chinese people
have no choice in the matter and very limited access to the fundamental freedoms
written into the Constitution, particularly those who have no connections within the
apparatus: their continuing predicament puts the rules into a diminished perspective.
The Chinese Communist Party has adapted to the economic and social environment
that it  has created and in so doing they have been able to postpone any transition
towards  democracy:  that  underlines,  as  Andrew  Nathan  puts  it,  authoritarian
resilience.  It  does  consult  the  “elites”  more,  including  the  “new elites”  that  it  has
promoted into its ranks or the people’s congresses; and it allows them more frequently
to express their preferences. But, at the same time, the Party has itself become more
elitist  than formerly;  it  holds  on  to  the  monopoly  of  selecting—and co-opting—the
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country’s leaders and “official elites”; and, for the time being, it refuses to open up the
political process—and even less the transfer of supreme power—to Chinese citizens as a
whole. In winning over large segments of the elites in the aftermath of Tiananmen and
especially  after  1992,  the  CCP  has  achieved  a  big  victory  and  contributed  to
substantially prolonging its life expectancy. However, this situation tends to create and
feed new tensions between state and society, the elites who are consulted and the rest
of the society which is not,  the ones who have benefited from the reforms and the
others who have not. These tensions may be managed by the new leadership for some
time, in particular if Hu and his colleagues eventually decide to address them, and in
particular in launching a true political reform package. Nevertheless, at the same time,
more and more members of the middle class and even the elites are constantly pushing
the limits  of  authoritarianism,  asking for  more freedom, transparency,  rule  of  law,
accountability and genuine elections, at least at the grassroots level. And one day, these
demands will inevitably lead them to raise the question of the one-Party system as a
whole.  Yes,  the  CCP  has  institutionalised  some  of  its  rules,  but  this  partial
institutionalisation is no passport to eternal stability.
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